U.S. Assistance and Terrorism: The Future of West Africa

In 2023, surpassing the Middle East and North Africa, the Sahel claimed 43% of all global terrorism deaths. The region’s dominant actor, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)–a movement linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb–is responsible for nearly 80% of all terrorist activity in the region, primarily concentrated in Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria. Despite 20 years of U.S.-sponsored counterterrorism efforts, the region continues to erupt with violence.

The U.S. in West Africa

On January 20th, Donald Trump assumed the Office of the President, and, in the weeks that followed, signed a series of executive orders that eliminated foreign assistance, targeted ongoing efforts to combat global terrorism, and diminished the importance of African partnerships in favor of resource exploitation. (At the time of writing, among many other conflict prevention and peace-focused government entities, the Department of Homeland Security’s Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships counterterrorism office is slated to close.)

American efforts to quell international terrorism began at the turn of the millennium, largely motivated by the 9/11 attacks and subsequent declaration of a global “War on Terror.” In West Africa, the U.S. government established the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) to implement regional counterterrorism measures. By 2008, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) was launched to improve security coordination on the continent.

AFRICOM Training Session (via @USAfricaCommand on X)

Despite these efforts (some even argue because of American intervention), West Africa is one of the most active terrorist hot zones in the world. The data attest to a growing insurgency. In 2000, the continent experienced only nine terrorist attacks; however, by 2022, nearly 2,800 took place in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso alone. International counterterrorism practitioners should ask: Why? 

Evidence demonstrates that U.S. efforts in the last 20 years have deteriorated regional security and exacerbated vulnerability to coups in partner countries. Since the early 2000s, U.S.-trained African officers have attempted nine coups, eight resulting in regime change. Most recently, in Niger, military professionalization (sponsored by the United States) encouraged further ethnic violence and incited a successful coup.

U.S. counterterrorism policy in Africa is effect-oriented; seldom is attention paid to the causes of terrorism. For example, in 2008, an American counterterrorism program in Mali focused primarily on building up military programs without addressing the underlying causes of terrorist activity and recruitment. As a result, U.S.-supported military action further legitimizes terrorist groups. In response to U.S. military support, religiously-motivated groups like JNIM often claim the title “defenders of the faith” against American “heretics” supporting corrupt regimes.

In the Trump era, the neglect of humanitarian and development aid may further allow terrorist organizations to garner support by providing economic opportunities through recruitment and food assistance. Efforts in West Africa should focus on building and supporting stronger democratic institutions, investing in African industries, and providing health assistance.

In Africa, Against Russia and China

In addition to a failed counterterrorism strategy, since the United States' rise to global hegemony in the 20th century, U.S. foreign policy has been primarily framed by challengers to its global leadership. Today, and increasingly under the Trump Administration, America is interested in competing with Russia (Wagner Group, now Africa Corps) and China for influence on the continent; seldom has the United States implemented a partnership-centered approach in Africa. 

Chinese-financed renovation of Leopold Sedar Senghor Stadium in Dakar, Senegal

As a result, conflict prevention, localization, and stabilization efforts are “made synonymous with, or only important when framed with their connection to greater geopolitics with Russia and China.” Projects like the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership, for example, are no longer a “means to a specific goal” but rather “an end in itself.”

Increased terrorism in the region is not only an American geopolitical calculus error. Russian mercenaries, private security companies, and exploitative industries further delegitimize African governments and deter democratic institution-building. In addition, West African coalition efforts have also broadly failed to implement effective counterterrorism measures. Many states in the region have porous borders and weak, corrupt national governments, allowing for terrorism to flow across states and operate under little government scrutiny.

Does Failure Warrant Pull-Out?

The U.S. withdrawal of aid and counterterrorism efforts under the Trump Administration lacks any semblance of strategy and is ill-suited given international developments in the region. Tariff wars are leaving many African countries economically decimated, with little hope of striking a deal given their low priority for the Administration. In addition, the disappearance of U.S. foreign assistance provided by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other agencies will result in avoidable deaths and violence. As Richard Betts at Columbia University noted, “Cuts to health and food programs that wind up costing lives will embitter affected populations and be exploited in propaganda by anti-American groups. This will have at least a moderate effect in boosting recruitment by terrorist organizations.”

Beyond American withdrawal, the recent United Nations Stabilization Mission in Mali and the French military retreat open power vacuums for regional power shifts, instability, and additional terrorist activity. Amongst the poorest Africans, lack of HIV/AIDS medication, food supplies, and other American support is already leading to overwhelmed national facilities and growing desperation, factors that often lead to terrorist legitimacy and recruitment (see Somalia).

Former USAID clinic in Zambia closes its doors, leaving dependent Zambians without HIV/AIDS medication (via NPR)

Where Does the U.S. in Africa Go From Here?

For decades, competing policy interests, an ill-conceived strategy, and an inefficient bureaucracy have stalled effective U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The Trump Administration's complete abandonment of USAID and diplomatic means will only fuel terrorism recruitment, activity, and legitimacy on the continent. Irrevocable damage will ensue.

Regardless, future administrations should not revert to incoherent counterterrorism strategies that plagued the first two decades of the 21st century. A new U.S. counterterrorism strategy should pivot from military-oriented, technical advancement for the political elite to institution-building, health cooperation, and economic investment.

Future counterterrorism efforts must engage with Africans as partners in growth, not pawns of geopolitics.